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CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
A TRAP FOR UNWARY POLITICIANS
By IAN MAcF. ROGERS, Q.C.*
Purity of Administration
Many great men have gone down in history. Just recently the Mayor of
Etobicoke went down. He was preceded, in the recent municipal election, by
a North York Controller and a Toronto Alderman. Whereas the latter ran in
the face of a judicial declaration of a conflict of interest and was defeated.
the former prudently decided not to run under such circumstances. Earlier in
1972, four Thunder Bay Aldermen were unseated. Probably only one of all
these deserved this fate. The others, whose motives were beyond reproach,
were caught in the meshes of the conflicts of interest provisions of The Muni-
cipal Act,:' a statutory trap for the honest but unwary local politician.
The purpose of all government is to bring about the greatest good for
the greatest number of citizens. The representative system of government is
designed to elect to office persons who impartially decide what is in "the
public interest". Thus we have a national Parliament, ten provincial Legisla-
tures and numerous local authorities. Parties traditionally have espoused
certain broad principles. While these have become less distinct than in the
past, support for candidates to elective office has been solicited on party lines;
a vote for a federal and provincial candidate is an affirmation of support for
his party and its platform. In Canada, municipal politics do not usually follow
these lines. Those offering themselves to the municipal voters simply advocate
their personal views without being committed to the policy of a particular
party.
It is highly desirable that those elected to govern are completely free to
arrive at decisions based on their opinions on policy, without being influenced
by factors or ulterior motives which would prevent disinterested and unbiased
decisions from being made. Public policy requires that, in order to ensure
purity of administration, any person who participates in the decision-making
process should not be in such a position that he might be suspected of being
biased. The fundamental rule that a personal interest in a matter disqualifies
a member from voting was firmly fixed in the ancient practice of parliamen-
tary bodies. A conflict of interest can be simply defined as any circumstance
where the personal interest of the council member in a matter before council
may prevent him, or appear to prevent him, from giving an unbiased decision
with respect to such matter.
It has never been settled beyond doubt whether the rule of public policy
*Member of the Ontario Bar, Toronto.
1 R.S.O. 1970, c. 284.
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which safeguards proceedings of the higher legislatures applies to the dele-
gated jurisdiction entrusted to municipalities in the administration of local
affairs. Their governing bodies are akin to legislatures in many respects and
it follows that their deliberations should be governed by the same rules. It is
all the more vital that this rule should apply to municipal councils, where party
affiliation does not play any part and personal caprice is sometimes given free
and unrestricted reign. Moreover, because of the small size of local councils,
it is possible for a minority of two on a five-man council to become a majority
of three at the next meeting. Putting it another way, a persuasive member
may more easily gain his selfish ends by talking his fellow councillors into ac-
cepting his views. In 1904, an Ontario court held that the rule applied to local
authorities.2
Mr. Justice Teetzell of the Supreme Court of Ontario in 1911 expressed
in these words the desirability of adopting such a rule:
It is of the utmost importance that members of a municipal council should have
no interest to bias their judgment in deciding what is for the public good and
they should strive to keep themselves absolutely free from the possibility of any
imputation in this respect.3
While serving on the council, members are under a duty to act in the best
interests of the corporation and of the citizens they represent. An individual
councillor occupies a fiduciary position. When he is acting in his personal
capacity, he can be said to be a trustee for the inhabitants in the sense that
any decision of the council, which results from the misuse of his office for the
purpose of private gain or advantage, is tainted with bad faith. In the case
against Toronto's Mayor Bowes in 1853, the court declared that a member of
council, "as trustee for the community, is not to vote or deal in such a way
as to gain or appear to gain private advantage out of matters over which he,
as one of the council, has supervision for the benefit of the public."4
The object of legislation respecting conflicts of interest is to prevent a
person whose private interests might clash with those of the municipality from
being elected to, and serving on, a council. No one who seeks to fill a munici-
pal office should be in a position where his duty may even appear to conflict
with his personal ends so as to bias his judgment in deciding what is for the
public good. It has been said judicially that the "policy of the law is that no
man shall be a member of a municipal council who cannot give a disinterested
vote on a matter of dispute which may arise."5
The origin of this rule is two-fold. There is a plain principle of justice,
as ancient as the law itself, that no one can be a judge in his own cause,
although perhaps this applies only when a council is functioning in a quasi-
judicial capacity. In any event, the well-established rule of equity which pre-
vents a trustee from making a profit of his office can be invoked in support.
2 Re L'Abbe and Blind River (1904), 7 O.L.R. 230 (Div. CL).
8R. v. Homan (1911), 19 O.W.R. 427, affd., 19 O.W.R. 621.
4 Paterson v. Bowes (1853), 4 Gr. 170 at 180. Toronto v. Bowes (1854), 4 Gr.
489, aifd. 6 Gr. 1, aff'd. 11 Mod. P.C. 463, C.R. [3] A.C. 10.
5 Per Wilson, J., in R. v. Gauthier (1869), 5 P.R. 24 (Judges Chambers).
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These principles are the logical outgrowth of the precepts of Judaeo-Christian
morality on which our society is based.
Misuse of Public Office
Notwithstanding the high ideal set for men in public office, there has,
from time to time, been a misuse of the authority entrusted to them. Since
the day when local self-government was established in Canada, elected repre-
sentatives have been tempted to use their knowledge and influence to advance
their selfish interests. Lawyers, insurance agents, real estate agents, and
accountants, who often sit on councils, have from time to time fallen from
grace because they were unable to resist temptation.
It is probably true to say that while we have never matched the Tam-
many Hall system in New York City for the harvest of graft and corruption it
reaped, our civic record is not unblemished. We in Canada have nothing to
be proud of, for breaches of trust in local government are becoming all too
frequent. The law reports record many cases where civic dishonesty has pro-
duced profit for an individual member of government or his friends, and
sometimes also a loss to the public treasury. In 1865, Mr. Bowes, then Mayor
of the City of Toronto, made personal gains by secretly purchasing, through
an intermediary, debentures which were being issued by the City at a discount.
He was compelled, after lengthy litigation, to pay his profits to the City.6
Publicly owned property has frequently been disposed of at bargain
prices to nominees of elected officials. An apartment site owned by the Ottawa
Public School Board was sold for $12,500 to Donald Trudeau, a front for the
chairman of the Board's finance committee which had fixed the price. This
was a different type of "fix" from the U.S. variety. The solicitor on the sale
was the Board's chairman. The land was later appraised at $60,000. Former
Reeve Tonks of York Township bought Township land through a nominee
and unsuccessfully appealed, to the Supreme Court of Canada, a decision
which required him to reconvey the land to the Township.7 In another case,
wives of two members of the council of the Town of Eastview, now Vanier,
bought lots owned by the Town at prices well below the market.
In Ontario until recently, three persons (the council member, his wife,
brother, cousins or aunts) by incorporating as a company, could do legally
what one person could not. By hiding behind the corporate veil, profitable
contracts with the municipality could be entered into with impunity. As Ot-
tawa's former Mayor Charlotte Whitton remarked as to this state of affairs
that, "you can sell to or buy from the city to your bank account's content".
Charlotte herself later ran afoul of the "thou shall nots" when she had a City
resolution quashed and thus had a "proceeding" against it which lost her her
seat.8 Firms owned by Archie McCoy, a Hamilton alderman, obtained
6 Supra, note 3.
7 Tonks v. York, [1967] S.C.R. 81, 59 D.L.R. (2d) 310, affg. [1965] 2 O.R. 381,
50 D.L.R. (2d) 674 (sub. nom. Reid v. York).
8R. v. Whitton, [1968] 1 O.R. 128, 65 D.LR. (2d) 568.
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$198,000 worth of business from that city, and a company owned by his
brother-in-law, on the assets of which McCoy had a chattel mortgage, also
did substantial business with the City. Former Mayor Hawrelak of Edmonton
held shares in both Trans-Canada Pipe Lines and Alberta Gas Trunk Line,
without disclosing the difficulty this might have created in the event of a re-
vision of the gas rates which prevailed in the City. After resigning his office
he was re-elected for another term, but has since been disqualified because
of another conflict of interest involving land development.9 Even then he
refused to admit that he had erred morally, claiming only that he had been
wrong "politically". The City compelled him to pay to it the profits he made.'0
The acceptance of gifts by members of local authorities, in the form of
free shares, trips to Mexico, or furniture are not far removed from outright
bribery. Calgary's former Mayor McKay was the object of the generosity of
many persons seeking favours from the City. Two members of York Town-
ship Council were charged with taking a bribe to ensure the issue of a building
permit; 1 both were subsequently acquitted after the Supreme Court of Can-
ada ordered a new trial. One must wonder how many politicians are under
obligation to someone because they accepted election contributions (without
strings, of course). Such contributions should be fully disclosed.
Legislative Approach
Provisions disqualifying persons from running for office, and elected
members of municipal councils from both holding office and voting appeared
in the Baldwin Act of 1849,12 the forerunner of the present day Municipal
Act. 13 The early disabling clauses were simple and brief compared with those
appearing in five pages of the 1970 Municipal Act. There have been
numerous statutory amendments since 1849, resulting in certain classes of
persons and types of transactions being exempted from the sanctions im-
posed. Frequently court cases have resulted in decisions permitting someone
with an obvious conflict of interest to escape from the consequences of a vio-
lation while others, acting bona fide, have been caught in a technical breach
of the statute. Exceptions to the exceptions confront the bewildered councillor
and his legal advisor. Loopholes still existed in the statutory maze for one
desiring to avoid the spirit of the law while still complying with its letter.
Conversely, there were traps for the person who sincerely wanted to avoid
any possible conflict situation.
The Municipal Act 4 declares certain persons ineligible to sit on council
by reason of holding another public office which is considered incompatible
0 R. v. Hawrelak (1965), 53 W.W.R. 257, (Alta. CA.); aff'd. 55 W.W.R. 320,
53 D.L.R. (2d) 673 (S.C.C.).
10 Edmonton v. Hawrelak, [1972] 2 W.W.R. 561, aff'd. [1973] 1 W.W.R. 179
(Alta. C.A.).
"1 See Hall & Linden v. R., [1962] S.C.R. 465 aff'g. [1961] O.W.N. 153.
12 12 Vict. c. 81.
13R.S.O. 1970, c. 284.
14Id., at s. 36(1) (a-p).
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with that of a municipal councillor. Examples of those in this class are, for
example, a judge, a Crown attorney, a chief constable, a member of a school
board or public utilities commission, and a municipal employee. Behind this
prohibition, there is undoubtedly the thought that political influence should
not enable a council member to secure for himself a job with the municipality.
There is also the view that the duties entailed in the enumerated positions
might conflict with the duties owed by a member toward the electors of the
municipality. Persons having a claim against the municipality or against whom
the municipality has a claim for tax arrears are likewise barred from office.
The application of s. 36(1) (e) of The Municipal Act15 had long been
in doubt. The reference to an employee of "the corporation of a municipality"
did not make it clear whether all municipal officers and employees were
barred from running for office in all municipalities or merely in the munici-
pality where they were employed. In Waffle v. Flynn,16 the newly-elected
Mayor of Etobicoke was unseated because he was Public Information Officer
of the City of Toronto at the time he was nominated and elected, although
he resigned from this post before he took office as Mayor. The irony was
that this clause, which had been in the Act for 70 years, was repealed just a
few days before the hearing, in order to allow employees with leave of ab-
sence to become candidates for office even in their own municipalities as well
as others.' 7 Mr. Dennis Flynn was re-elected Mayor by an overwhelming
majority in a by-election held about 70 days after he was unseated.
A councillor having an interest in a contract with a municipal corpora-
tion or local board was frequently ousted from office. Many an aspiring can-
didate and sitting member has run afoul of this provision. The term "interest"
was used in its broadest sense and did not presuppose the existence of pecu-
niary gain. A teacher's contract was excepted.
Until 1961, a person was not ineligible for office or liable to lose his
seat by reason only of being a shareholder in a company having contractual
relations with the municipal corporation. By the simple expedient of incorpo-
rating a company, a member of a council or local board could bring himself
within the exemption. The only drawback was that the shareholder could not
vote on any matter affecting the company, but even then there was no penalty
imposed. It is difficult to see why immunity was conferred on one owning
99% of the voting stock. The Legislature finally came to realize this in 1962
and deprived any member of the exemption if he had a controlling interest
in the company either personally or through his spouse.'8
Even apart from statutory provisions, the courts have held that a council
member is disqualified from voting on any question in which he has a special
15 Id.
16 Decided by Cavers, C.CJ. on January 25, 1973.
1721 Eliz. II, c. 169, s. 11. Proclaimed January 17, 1973.
18 The Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 284, s. 36(3) (a) repealed by 21 Eliz. II,
c. 169, s. 1.
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and personal interest distinct from that of the inhabitants generally. 19 While
the public and personal duties of a councillor may conflict, it is not necessary,
so far as the application of the rule is concerned, that they do. It is not essen-
tial to find that a vote was affected by the interest; the mere possibility that it
might be so affected is considered sufficient to disentitle the member from
voting. The principle applies, therefore, not only where there is a pecuniary
interest but also where there is a reasonable probability that the interested
councillor is likely to be biased. 20
In 1962 the general principle was incorporated into the statute by the
enactment of a disclosure requirement and a prohibition against voting on any
contract or matter in which the councillor has a "pecuniary" interest.21 Where
such interest exists, the councillor must reveal it and then refrain from taking
part in the discussion of or voting on the matter. Thus finally, after over 100
years, Ontario has adopted a cardinal rule which has been in the Quebec
Municipal Code and the Imperial statutes for decades.
A New Approach - The Code of Conflicts
The law until 1972 was inadequate in several respects and did not ensure
purity of administration. It failed to cite general principles insofar as they
could be adopted in a statute, and provided for disqualification only in specific
cases. The Municipal Act's disabling provisions, being penal in nature, have
been strictly interpreted by the courts to exclude their application in cases not
provided for. Of course, it may in fact be impossible for the statute to be
exhaustive and comprehensive. Were an attempt made to codify the law
further and to establish a definitive code, we would probably end up with
a lengthy statute similar to the Quebec Municipal Bribery and Corruption
Act.22 As the New York City Board of Ethics has stated "... a code which is
unnecessarily rigid and restrictive will defeat its purpose. It would discourage
qualified persons from entering government and will have a demoralizing
effect upon encumbents."
In specifying certain exemptions from disqualification, on the basis that
the nature of the conflict was not serious enough to warrant the imposition
of the penalty, the Act precluded a defence of bona fides by the well-inten-
tioned offender. It took no account of minor infractions that arose through
inadvertence, and assumed that in every case a council member dealing con-
tractually with a council was acting for his own selfish ends. In situations
where a loss of seat was not entailed, the provisions permitted conflicts of
interest to exist and to continue, if such interest was revealed. However no
penalty was imposed for non-disclosure or failure to refrain from voting,
except in the case of a shareholder in respect of corporate contracts, who
suffered the loss of his exemption and possibly his seat.
19 Re L'Abbe and Blind River, supra, note 2.
201d. See also Starr v. Calgary (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 726 (Alta. S.C.).
21 The Municipal Act, s. 199.
22 R.S.Q. 1964, c. 173.
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A special committee of senior civil servants was established by the
Ontario Government to enquire into the problems in this area. Representa-
tions were received from other groups and recommendations were published
in 1968.23 The main proposal called for adoption of the principle of disclo-
sure, rather than specification of detailed disqualifying clauses. Penalties were
to be applicable only where a person having a conflict failed to disclose.
In 1972, The Municipal Conflicts of Interest Act 24 was enacted to give
effect to this recommendation. The Hon. Dalton Bales, Q.C., then Attorney-
General, in introducing the legislation in the House, stated that under the
present law "municipal government can be deprived of the services of good
people" because of the penalty of loss of office for having contractual rela-
tions with the corporation. He also pointed out that failing to disclose an
interest not involving a contract did not bring about forfeiture of office.
Under the new Act, the failure of a council member to disclose a pecu-
niary interest in any matter coming before council renders him liable to have
his seat declared vacant on the application of a ratepayer. Section 36 of The
Municipal Act has been re-enactedm so that persons having contracts with,
or claims against, the municipality are now eligible to sit.
A case which demonstrates the difference in the old and new approaches
involved former Toronto alderman Ben Grys, whose wife had a mortgage on
land being rezoned for high rise apartments. No disclosure of his wife's
interest was made by the alderman who voted when the matter came up both
at committee and before the planning board. The City Council, in an act of
censure, passed a resolution that Grys had a conflict and Grys promptly
instituted an action for a declaration that he did not. The action was dis-
continued seven days after the writ was issued but it was too late to save the
alderman from being caught by s. 36(1) (q), which declares a person to be
ineligible if he has an action or proceeding against the corporation. 26 Alder-
man Grys was hoisted by his own petard. Ironically, since the interest was
through his wife, he would not have been pinioned for this by the new Code,
although he would likely have been caught by its "failure-to-disclose" provi-
sion. Such an interest would not have led to disqualification under the old
provision since it was not of a contractual nature.
Another departure in the new Code of Conflicts27 relates to the penalty.
Formerly where a member was forced to vacate his seat because of disquali-
fication he could purge himself of his wrongdoing and run for office at the
28 Report of the Ontario Committee on Conflicts of Interest, (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 1968). The enquiry was instituted as the result of Re Election of Collins, [19671
2 O.R. 41 in which an alderman of the City of London was unseated because, while an
employee of the London Transportation Commission he had signed a contract with the
latter as union secretary.
24 The Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, 1972, S.O. 1972, s. 5(1).
25 Supra, note 17.
26 Re Grys & Stratton, [1972] 2 O.R., reversed by CA. not yet reported.
27 Supra, note 24.
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next election. While his ineligibility should not be permanent, it should con-
tinue for several years even if the circumstances giving rise to it have been
removed. The judge is empowered by the new Act to declare the member to
be ineligible for re-election for a period of up to seven years.28 This discre-
tionary jurisdiction enables the judge to differentiate between degrees of con-
flict and to award a heavier penalty in the case of more serious violations.
There is much to be said for the Conflicts of Interest Act and the prin-
ciple of full disclosure on which it is based. There should be no question
about when a person has a "pecuniary" interest. The interest does not neces-
sarily have to be a monetary one, however, since it is possible to have a
conflict even in the absence of a profit motive. The honest, well-intentioned
councillor is not likely to run afoul of its sanctions as long as he discloses,
although some profit-motivated councillor may regard the legislation as an
open invitation to do business with the corporation. Does the Act require him
to reveal his profit to the taxpayers?
It may be that public censure and the ballot box are the ultimate reme-
dies. It remains to be seen whether the concept of public disclosure will result
in the electorate weeding out those whose ethical conduct is open to question.
This, of course, assumes an interested and enlightened democracy. In at least
one Canadian city, the voters forgave their Mayor's fall from grace.29 Even
if the Act does not guarantee that municipal administrations will be purer
than in the past, it does succeed in simplifying the law in this area and remov-
ing uncertainties which have existed for many years.
2 8 The Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, 1972, s. 5(1).
20 See text, supra, at p. 6 for a discussion of Mayor Hawrelak of Edmonton.
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